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Abstract 
[This work explores the emergence and evolution of the rhetoric choice rhetoric 
as it pertains to contemporary American abortion politics. <Choice> is explored from an 
ideographic perspective, borrowing from the theoretical framework for ideographic 
rhetorical criticism established by Michael Calvin McGee. The analysis begins with a 
diachronic analysis of the emergence of the ideograph of <choice> within the law with an 
investigation of the written decisions in four Supreme Court cases central to the 
construction of the right to choose: Roe v. Wade (1973), Maher v. Roe (1977), Harris v. 
McRae (1980), and Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989). This investigation 
reveals a synchronic relationship between <choice> and another higher order ideograph, 
<liberty>. The criticism continues with an investigation of the usage of <choice> by pro-
choice advocates in two documents published by NARAL Pro-Choice America, Choices: 
Women Speak About Abortion is a collection of women’s narratives about their 
experiences obtaining an abortion, and Breaking Barriers, a guide for the development 
and implementation of proactive policy campaigns for pro-choice advocates. McGee’s 
method is employed to investigate the ideographic usage of <choice> within these 
documents, revealing the ideographic abstraction that associates the alleged idea content 
of ideographs.  This ideographic analysis reveals the inability of <choice> to live up to its 
alleged idea content as a result of the limitations inherent in the grounding of <choice> 
within the higher order ideograph of <liberty> and the impact of these limitations on 
particular populations, mainly indigent women in the United States.  ] 
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CHAPTER 1 - Foundations of choice 
I grew up in an adamantly pro-choice household. When I was as young as 7 years 
old, I can remember tagging along with my mother to pro-choice rallies at the state 
house. My mother would keep the posters and signs from rallies and hang them all over 
the house. For years, our living room was adorned with signs that read ''keep abortion 
legal.'' While I grew up in a very activist household, I never became an abortion activist. I 
knew that there was a time when abortion had been illegal, but I felt like my generation 
was growing up in ''the era of choice'' in which women were free to make choices about 
when and even how to have children. While I always voted for pro-choice candidates and 
occasionally argued with friends who voted for candidates because of their pro-life 
stance, I was never that interested in being involved with pro-choice activism.  
As I grew up and started to learn about feminism and feminist theory, I began to 
think that feminism was necessarily divided, and that the basic foundational feminist 
theories I had read were essentialist meaning that most feminist theories seemed to 
assume that there were essential feminine characteristics shared by all women. I came to 
think that these theories lacked recognition of differences among and between different 
women. In other words, I came to think of feminism as fundamentally flawed because it 
represents the experiences of privileged white women. I began to seek theory that could 
account for the experiences of all women. I wanted to be a feminist, but I didn't want to 
align with any theory or idea that privileged particular experiences at the exclusion of 
others.  
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My idea that feminism was a fractionalized and ineffective ideology was blown to 
pieces in Washington D.C. on April 24th, 2004. I knew that the March for Women's lives 
was on this particular day, but I had just finished hosting a conference for over 500 
people over the previous three days and I was tired. As I drove home from the closing 
ceremony of the conference I ended up stuck in traffic that was backed up because of the 
march. Realizing that I wasn't going anywhere in the car, I found a parking spot and 
decided to check out the pro-choice march. It was a spectacle. There were all sorts of 
people marching, wearing colorful clothes and carrying signs of all shapes and sizes. 
There were huge puppets, a group of 
women all wearing pink slips (the kind 
that go underneath a dress) handing out 
flyers that said ''Pink Slip Bush''. The 
creativity of political expression was 
extremely intriguing. I was most 
amazed by the diversity of those 
marching, holding signs while chanting “this is what a feminist looks like”. Marching in 
front of me was a group representing an organization of women of color from Boston, I 
saw the ''raging grannies'' as we marched, many people were carrying signs (shown above 
in green) exclaiming ''another _____________ for choice''. I could see women in the 
distance who may or may not have known that they were marching next to eachother 
holding these signs where they had filled in the blank. One read ''Another Catholic for 
Choice'' while the other read ''Another Muslim for Choice''. I couldn't believe that all of 
these different types of women from all different backgrounds were all marching together 
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around this notion of <choice>. It didn’t necessarily surprise me that women with such 
different backgrounds identified themselves as standing for <choice>, but it did call into 
question my previous belief that feminists were divided and fractured along identity lines. 
For me, The March for Women's Lives represented the actual practice of diverse women 
setting aside their identity differences for a common cause, so common that even the 
most disparate of women could come together to decry the identity construct of feminism 
by chanting '' this is what a feminist looks like'' as if to shatter the notion that a feminist 
looks like any one thing.  
After the March for Women's Lives, I began to think that maybe abortion was an 
issue that could unite feminists. I also began to think about what it means to stand for 
<choice>. I was not particularly educated about the law and where the ''right to choose'' 
came from, so I started to research the Pro-Choice Movement. This thesis is a result of 
that research; it began as an attempt to answer the questions: Where does <choice> come 
from, what does it mean, and Does <choice> accomplish what it sets out to? Researching 
the politics of abortion has raised questions about the efficacy of the ideology of 
<choice>, and it has called into question feminist theorizing about the role of privacy in 
maintaining women's oppression.  
There is little doubt that abortion is one of the most polarizing issues in America, 
with the “pro-life” movement on one side, declaring that abortion should be restricted and 
the “pro-choice” movement on the other, demanding the availability of safe abortions. 
Millions of Americans sit squarely on one side of this issue and for many it is considered 
a very personal political issue. As a student of rhetoric who investigates the force of 
language in society, I focus on “not simply the formal and final words of particular 
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speakers, but the culture of a text – the ideology – that is produced and performed in and 
through a larger, macro rhetorical process of active intertextualization” (Corbin, 1998 
p.17). This ideographic method uncovers the ways in which subtle and benign linguistic 
choices interact with social and historical contexts to create meaning and inform 
ideology. Applying this rhetorical perspective to the rhetoric of proponents of the 
availability of abortion has called into question the use of the term “pro-choice”. As 
recently as 2003 the National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), the largest 
organization in the US committed to maintaining a woman's right to choose, changed its 
name to add “Pro Choice America” (naral.org, 2006) to its moniker. It seems nearly 
impossible these days to support a woman’s right to obtain an abortion and divorce one’s 
self from being “pro-choice”. This work seeks to explore the ideographic nature of 
<choice>. This project traces its emergence out of the abortion controversy during the 
sixties and seventies in an effort to situate <choice> as an American Feminist ideograph 
contrasted off of the realities of the availability of the “right to choose.” Furthermore, the 
implications of this ideograph on the continued success of feminist organizations that 
champion the right to choose are explored in order to evaluate the ability of feminist 
organizations to achieve their goals. 
This project addresses the primary research question: Does the relation between 
the ideographic status of <choice> to that of privacy provide a productive rhetorical 
mechanism for ensuring that all women have access to reproductive rights? This question 
cannot be resolved without laying the foundation for asking the question. Prior to 
engaging in a rhetorical criticism of the usage of <choice> it is necessary to summarize 
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theWhat follows here, is a summary of the historical foundations of <choice>, in the 
context of the emergence American feminist theory. 
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Historical Foundations of <choice> 
 
Women of the 19th and early 20th century were awakening to the ways in which 
the industrial revolution had transferred labor “out of the private home and into the public 
workplace”(Tong, 1998 p.12). It was undeniable that as men’s labor moved into the 
public sphere and generated income for the household, women’s roles became relegated 
to the private sphere. As such, women’s labor became devalued and under the scrutiny of 
their male heads of household. During the nineteenth century, particularly middle and 
upper class women became known as “kept women” (12) who were stripped of their 
decision making ability as the notion of the reasonable man and the emotional women 
emerged out of prominent scholars of the time like Rousseau (13). As a result women of 
this time period were denied liberty “because they were not permitted to make their own 
decisions”(12). Indeed, “gender was an important division in American politics, men and 
women operated, for the most part, in distinct political subcultures” (Baker p.56); women 
operated from the domestic sphere while men operated out of the public sphere.  
As feminists began to theorize about the relegation of women to the home, the 
public/private dichotomy was articulated as the primary mechanism for the legal 
subordination of women. Ferdinand Schoeman argues in his 1992 book, “Privacy and 
Social Freedom” that “Our institution of privacy keeps women domesticated, isolates, 
and thus politically and ideologically voiceless” (p.13-14). The belief that the 
public/private dichotomy subordinates women is shared by many feminist legal scholars 
who argue that the law codifies this dichotomy and hence women’s powerlessness. Diane 
Polan argues that “The legal system has also used the public/private dichotomy in 
another, more subtle fashion that has further reinforced patriarchy. By placing the 
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operation of the law squarely in the public realm…Thus, the legal system has functioned 
to legitimate that very distinction” (1990 p.422). Collapsing the public/private dichotomy 
became the primary goal of feminist theorizing.  
As women began to resist the divisions between the public and the private, 
autonomy and the denial of liberty, their demands reflected particular types of women. 
Those reflected in feminist demands were women who had experienced this 
public/private dichotomy through relegation to the home. bell hooks argues that those 
who view escape from domesticity as the sole precondition for women’s equality clearly 
speak from a white middle class perspective in which perhaps the only thing holding 
them back was motherhood and staying home to take care of the family and house. She 
writes, “Black women would not have said motherhood prevented us from entering the 
world of paid work because we have always worked” (1984, p.133). Many scholars 
(hooks, Davis) have argued that early liberal American feminist articulations like the 
Seneca Falls Convention failed to account for the experiences of women of color, and 
even go as far as to argue that “the convention rendered black women invisible” (Tong, p. 
21). The foundation for modern American feminism is undoubtedly a reflection of 
women who experience the public/private dichotomy in particular ways. 
As the public/private dichotomy came to exemplify the norm of women’s 
experience in the United States, the public framing of the issue of abortion was 
undergoing a metamorphosis. Until the 1860’s the term abortion had a meaning 
synonymous with the term miscarriage (Smith-Rosenberg, p. 219). When states began to 
pass laws restricting abortion as intentional miscarriage, the language began to change 
identifying that which was being regulated as “criminal abortion” (p. 219). Until the latter 
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part of the nineteenth century, there was legal precedent in the United States to support 
legal abortion, “by 1860, there had been nine state-supreme-court decisions concerning 
abortion; seven held that abortion before quickening did not constitute a criminal 
offense” (p. 219). As a result of a vast American Medical Association campaign against 
the practice of abortion, “by the early 1880’s, most states had enacted harsh anti-abortion 
laws”(p. 220). Nineteenth century anti abortion activity in the United States culminated in 
1873 with the passage of the Comstock Law. This law forbade the use of the U.S. Postal 
Service in the distribution of “any drug, medicine, or article for abortion or contraceptive 
purposes, forbade the advertisement of such items through the United States mails, and 
outlawed their manufacture or sale in the District of Columbia and the Federal 
Territories” (p. 222).  With the advance of the Comstock Law, state restrictions on 
abortion tightened and for the first time in American history, abortion became a criminal 
act in many states. In this climate, many states opted to restrict or ban abortion 
procedures entirely. Many women were unable to obtain safe, legal abortions and the 
practice of “back alley abortions” was common for a over a century. In 1964, in New 
York City alone, ten thousand women sought medical treatment for illegal abortions (p. 
223). 
It is difficult to trace the origins of the term <choice> in relation to abortion. As 
early as 1969, several groups such as NARAL, the National Organization of Women 
(NOW) and Zero Population Growth (ZPG), came together to support a demonstration on 
mothers day called “Children by Choice”. More than one scholar have identified this 
particular demonstration as the moment in which <choice> came onto the scene as a term 
used to advance the cause of abortion (Staggenborg, 1991 p. 51; Sollinger, 2001 p. 5). 
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Condit indicates that <choice> did not achieve ideographic status in the abortion debate 
until the seventies, “Even in the earliest stages of the controversy, for some activists the 
rights, freedoms, or choices of women were at issue. Although these voices did not 
become the most audible ones until the seventies, a public rhetoric gradually developed 
which framed the controversy as a ‘woman’s choice’” (1990, p. 67). It is likely that the 
preeminent work documenting the history of the Pro Choice movement is Suzanne 
Staggenborg’s The Pro-Choice Movement: Organization and Activism in the Abortion 
Conflict. In her telling of the history of the Pro-Choice movement, Staggenborg only 
discusses the adoption of the terminology of <choice> in a footnote where she asserts that 
<choice> was a term adopted by the movement after Roe v. Wade in response to the 
emerging Pro-Life movement (1991, p. 188). Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision, 
the movement was referred to as the “abortion movement” (p. 188).  
Staggenborg (1991) indicates that within the movement, the primary objection 
levied against “Pro-Choice” language was that prior to Roe, one of the initial goals of the 
movement was to bring abortion into the forefront (p. 188). Howard Moody, a minister at 
a New York church in the late 1960’s who used to refer women to abortionists pre-Roe 
confirms this, telling of how abortion was a taboo term during that era, so much so, that 
an important strategy at the time was to “free that word up…to free it from the silence” 
because “abortion was so underground, so hidden” (Gorney, 1989 p.D1 ). Staggenborg 
indicates that critics of the term <choice> at the time argued that it was merely another 
“euphemism” for abortion (p. 188). Ultimately, those in favor of the term <choice> won 
out because it assisted in constructing an image of a position that was not “pro-abortion” 
but rather, a position that saw abortion as a <choice> of last resort (p. 188). 
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 In 1973 the United States Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in 
Roe v. Wade ruling that state restrictions of abortion were unconstitutional, denying a 
woman's right to privacy. The court's decision in Roe is informed by years of case law 
surrounding the constitutional protection of the right to privacy. In Roe, the court cites 
the 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut that the rights of married persons to use 
contraception is protected under “right of marital privacy which is within the penumbra 
of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.” (p.481-86). In Griswold the court established 
that the right to use contraceptives was protected under the due process right to be free 
from state interference from intrusion into the private lives of individuals (McDonagh, p. 
107-8). This right was again confirmed in 1972 in Eisenstadt v. Baird where the Supreme 
Court extended the rights of married couples to use contraception to unmarried 
individuals. The Ninth Amendment is where the court, in Griswold v. Connecticut 
derived and applied the right to privacy to marital relationships even though the right to 
privacy is not explicit in the constitution (Hirschenbaum, 2000 p. 329). It is important to 
note that the right to privacy is not explicitly articulated in the Constitution or the Bill of 
Rights. Much of the debate about the constitutional basis for the right to Choose arises 
out of the court's assertion in Griswold that privacy is ''within the penumbra'' of 
thguarentees in the bill of rights. Many criticize Justice Blackmun's opinion for failing to 
elaborate ''The textual foundations of the privacy right'' (Eisgruber, 2001 p.82).  
The majority decision in Roe was written by Justice Blackmun and provides 
evidence that the court played a role in establishing the preeminence of the rhetoric of 
<choice> versus Life in the abortion controversy. In siding with the appellant, the 
decision states that the Texas statutes “improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by 
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the pregnant woman, to choose to terminate her pregnancy”(Roe v. Wade, 1973) . 
Blackmun laboriously outlined the history of abortion jurisprudence and in so doing 
noting, “the opportunity to make this choice was present in this country well into the 19th 
century” (Roe v. Wade, 1973) in order to establish legal justification for the right to 
obtain an abortion. Justice Blackmun, may not have been the first to use the rhetoric of 
<choice> in relation to abortion, but his adherence to <choice> as a means of explaining 
a woman’s right to privacy codified <choice> as an appropriate justification for abortion 
and enabled the abortion movement to adopt language already legitimized by its use in 
the written decision. 
Angela Hooten (2005), the Associate Director of Policy and Advocacy at the 
National Latina Institute for Reproductive Health argues that the court’s reliance on 
privacy as the right to be free from government interference as the justification for legal 
abortion is directly related to the movement’s adoption of <choice> as its moniker: 
The impact that Roe has had on the reproductive rights movement cannot be 
understated; Roe has shaped the movement’s focus from both a practical and 
theoretical standpoint…Textual support for the right to privacy is expressly 
negative- the right to be free from state interference. The movement has co-opted 
this language and developed an individual rights framework to guide the 
theoretical arguments it advances for reproductive rights (p. 62-63) 
 
 For Hooten the first theoretical principle derived from Roe by the movement is Choice 
(2005, p. 63). 
 Since the 1970’s <choice> has been the primary slogan for those who support the 
right to obtain an abortion.  This is so much the case that it is difficult to think of a term 
for those who support the right to an abortion other than Pro Choice. Pro Choice is not 
only the name of a movement, but there are values and ideologies embedded in the notion 
of <choice>. For example, liberty and control over one’s own destiny are entwined with 
 12 
<choice>. ''The Supreme Court has elevated reproductuve liberty to the level of a 
fundamental right against government interference deserving of the highest judicial 
scrutiny'' (Roberts, 1997, p. 294). <choice> is a word that tangibly describes the desires 
of women to control their own lives.  
Today, <choice> is a prominent feminist ideograph. The right to an abortion has 
become conflated with the right to Choose and the right to Choose is often credited for 
the gains of women in the latter half of the twentieth century. Some argue that the 
advancement of women in the public sphere is directly related to the right to obtain an 
abortion arguing that “Women’s influx into higher education and the professions” 
(Mentone, 2002 p.2660) is a “result of the Supreme Court’s declaration of a 
constitutional right to an abortion” (2002, p. 2660).  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, before 
joining the Supreme Court asserted that reproductive autonomy was crucial in women’s 
attempts to “participate as men's full partners in the nation's social, political, and 
economic life” (1985, p. 375). Indeed, many women see anti-choice advocates as 
threatening “Women's hard-earned status as legal subjects, as citizens, and as individuals 
in their own right” (Hirschmann, 2003). This right to Choose is solidly built upon 
adherence to privacy as Kristina Mentone points out: 
The privacy argument acknowledges that no woman, regardless of how powerless 
or powerful she may be, can be forced to have a baby. It protects women who 
intentionally get pregnant and then change their minds. It protects women who 
consensually have sex but accidentally get pregnant. It protects women who are 
pregnant due to rape or coercion. It protects women who are pregnant by men 
who are willing to support the baby. It protects all women, all the time. (Mentone 
2002, p. 2602) 
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For advocates of the right to privacy encompassing a woman's right to Choose, it is seen 
as the ultimate protection capable of protecting all women, in any situation. As such, the 
right to privacy has become a crucial component of modern American women's progress.  
Reproductive freedom is central to the feminist agenda, and that freedom is 
secured through the “right to choose”. There are very few feminist concerns that trump 
the right to an abortion, the National Organization for Women (NOW) lists abortion as its 
number one on its web page (now.org, 2006). NARAL Pro-Choice America, a feminist 
organization that bills themselves as “leading advocate for privacy and a woman's 
right to choose” boasts over 1 million members (naral.org) and as recently as 2004 
staged the largest march on Washington ever with over 1.5 million people marching for 
their cause.   
Since 1973 the court has had to explain and elaborate upon the ''textual foundation 
of the right to privacy'' in several cases. These instances in which the Court rearticulates 
liberty and the right to privacy, and how the right to choose is derived as a privacy right 
provide an opportunity to explore how <choice> comes to constitute itself.  
One of those instances arises out of a piece of legislation that has spurred several 
challenges in the courts. In 1976 Congress passed the Hyde Amendment (Staggenborg, 
1991, p. 81) which banned the use of public funds for the procurement of an abortion. 
This meant (and continues to mean) that women who depend on the federal government 
for healthcare do not have access to abortions. The number of people affected by the 
Hyde Amendment are staggering, this population includes “Native Americans who use 
the government funded Indian Health Services, federal employees and their dependents, 
federal prisoners, Peace Corps volunteers, military personnel and their dependents, 
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teenagers participating in the state Children’s Health Insurance Program, and low-income 
residents of Washington, D.C.” as well as women who rely on Medicaid for their 
healthcare (Sollinger, 2001 p. 109).  In the year prior to the passage of the Hyde 
Amendment the government funded 300,000 abortions, compared to a mere 300 
government funded abortions under the Hyde Amendment in 1992 (Roberts, 1997 p. 
231). The Hyde amendment and state funding bans like it have repeatedly been upheld in 
the courts, and in each instance the court asserts limitations of the right to privacy. First 
in Maher v. Roe (1977), and then in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989).  
The court has reasserted its justification for it's decision in Roe most vehemently in 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992). In this case the court 
ruled on the constitutionality of four regulations the state of Pennsylvania had placed 
upon abortions: the requirement of parental and/or spousal notification, an informed 
consent provision, and that clinics report to the state the medical records of their patients.  
More recently the Supreme Court has articulated it's interpretation of a woman's right to 
choose in  Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) in which the Court weighed in on the 
constitutionality of  Congressional Legislation that regulates specific abortion procedures 
in latter trimester abortions.  
In each instance of the Court's hearing and deciding these abortion cases, the Pro-
Choice community has responded, in many cases compiling amicus briefs to submit to 
the Court, providing tool-kits for local activists about how to effectively combat 
restrictions on the Right to Choose. These have all provided opportunities for the 
movement to articulate its interpretation of the Right to Choose. These texts provide 
ample opportunity to rhetorically analyze the notion of <choice>.  
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Feminism, Abortion and Rhetorical Studies 
Many rhetorical scholars approach their research through a feminist lens. Most of 
these scholars do so via the application of feminist rhetorical criticism. Feminist 
rhetorical critics analyze rhetoric “to discover how the rhetorical construction of gender is 
used as a means for oppression and how that process can be challenged and resisted” 
(Foss, 1996 p. 168). This is accomplished through analyzing the ways in which gender 
roles are depicted within particular artifacts that are not routinely consider to be feminist 
rhetorics. Feminist rhetorical critics usually engage an artifact that is seen as outside of 
the scope of feminist rhetoric, like a sport, movie or television show in order to illustrate 
the ways in which the artifact contributes to particular gender constructions. However, 
the feminist movement has produced a plethora of artifacts that are of less concern to 
feminist rhetorical critics because these artifacts are already injected with feminist 
undertones from their inception.  
More work has been done about feminist artifacts by communication scholars 
who focus their research on social movements (or the rhetoric of protest) than rhetorical 
critics. These scholars like Karlyn Kohrs Campbell argue that feminist rhetoric, which 
she coins “the rhetoric of women’s liberation” should not be lumped into social 
movement rhetoric, rather that the rhetorical study of feminism requires its own field of 
study (Campbell, 1973 p. 208).      
More specifically, some rhetorical critics have engaged in research about the 
rhetoric of abortion. Those who do so tend to apply a particular form of criticism to a 
particular instance of Pro-Choice rhetoric. In Consciousness-raising as collective 
rhetoric: the articulation of experience in the Redstockings' abortion speak-out of 1969, a 
2005 article by Tasha Dubriwny shows how the articulation of individual experience in 
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this particular speak out shed insight upon the potential for the expression individual 
experience  can contribute to the development of a collective rhetoric, explanding upon 
previous theories of collective rhetoric. In another rhetorical work on abortion,In 
Vilification and Social Movements: A Case Study of Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Rhetoric, a 
1989 article by Marsha L. Vanderford, the rhetoric of two local Minnesota organizations 
are analyzed to explore the utlity of enemy construction in the maintenance of social 
movements.  
The most comprehensive work in the field of rhetoric about abortion is Celeste 
Condit's ''Decoding Abortion Rhetoric: Communicating Social Change'' in which she 
provides for an account of the development of both Pro-Choice and Pro-Life rhetoric 
from. In her rhetorical analysis of abortion rhetoric condit considers two units of 
discourse: rhetoric in narrative form, and ideographic forms. In narratives Condit seeks 
the establishment of myths and characterizations to evaluate the ways in which abortion 
rhetoric shifts public consciousness. In considering ideographs, Condit explores the 
extent to which the ''political right to abortion required a revision of American 
ideographic structure'' (1990, p. 13) as well as an account of the ideographic justifications 
for the right to choose.  
In writing about abortion Celeste Condit (1990) argues that ideographs are a form 
of “'ultimate term’- special words or phrases that express the public values” (p. 13) and 
establishes that within the abortion debate, <choice> is the “ideographic representation of 
women’s needs in the polity” (p. 68) because the term was “a direct articulation of 
material demands faced by women” (p. 68) in the context of increasing biological and 
economic choices available to women in the middle of the twentieth century (p. 68). 
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Communication scholars like Condit have done much work to establish that <choice> 
operates in an ideographic form. This work seeks to extend upon such research to 
investigate and reveal the social realities surrounding women’s right to choose. 
This work embarks upon an analysis of <choice> as the ideographic signifier of 
liberal advocates of a woman's right to obtain an abortion. This project purports to be 
neither an advocacy nor an opposition to the practice of abortion. Instead, this project will 
analyze the way in which this legally established right manifests itself ideographically 
and to expose what it both conceals and reveals. The project proceeds in the following 
manner. 
Preview of Chapters 
Chapter two lays out the method used to rhetorically analyze the rhetoric of 
<choice>.Specifically, Michael Calvin Mcgee's theory of the ideograph is introduced, 
followed by an articulation of precisely how an ideographic criticism unfolds. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the purpose and importance of this particular form of 
rhetorical criticism.   
Chapter three begins the analysis  by looking at oral arguments before the 
supreme court in Roe v. Wade (1973), Maher v. Roe (1977), Harris v.McRae, (1980), and 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989),.to reveal the extent to which the right to 
choose is embedded in the right to privacy and hence <liberty>. This chapter discusses 
the implications of embedding the right to choose in privacy and liberty  arguing that 
privacy as enumerated by the supreme court is not capable of ensuring that all women 
have equal access to the right to an abortion.  
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 Chapter Four reads two documents that represent the ways in which the Pro-
Choice movement responds to the ways in which the Court articulates Choice by 
asserting their own notions of Choice. The first document, Choices is a selection of 
women's stories produced by NARAL Pro-Choice America as the result of a large amicus 
brief of women's narratives NARAL filed with the supreme court during the Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services trial in 1989. This chapter investigates the ways in which 
real women who have had to decided whether or not to obtain an abortion articulate 
<choice> in their own lives. The second document is produced by NARAL Pro-Choice 
America for Pro-Choice Activists who are primarily concerned with issues pertaining to 
women of color called Breaking Down Barriers. This ninety page action guide for pro-
choice activists outlines tha major reproductive rights issues facing women of color and 
serves as a guide for pro-choice community organizing to combat restrictions on abortion 
at the local level.  
Chapter five entails a discussion of this critical reading of the ideograph of choice,  
Because this work shows the ways in which choice is derived directly from the court's 
articulation of privacy which, in turn is directly derived from the constitution's 
articulation of the citizen's liberty interest, this study seeks to contribute to McGee's 
liberty analysis and to uncover additional ways in which liberty operates to mask 
presicely what it seeks to bestow.  
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CHAPTER 2 -  Ideographic Criticism, revealing the concealed 
In a 1980 Quarterly Journal of Speech article, Michael Calvin McGee wrote 
about the ways in which language contributes to the construction and maintenance of 
ideologies in societies. He argued that “human beings are conditioned…to a vocabulary 
of concepts that function as guides, warrants, reasons, or excuses for behavior and belief” 
(McGee, 1980a, p 6).  For him, “the political language which manifests ideology seems 
characterized by slogans, a vocabulary of ‘ideographs’” (p. 5). These ideographs are “ 
both units of persuasion and warrants for action and behavior” (Delgado, p. 5)  that “exist 
in real discourse, functioning clearly and evidently as agents of political consciousness” 
(McGee, 1980a, p. 7) and can be defined as “an ordinary language term found in political 
discourse. It is a higher order abstraction representing collective commitment to a 
particular but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal” (p. 15). McGee identifies 
ideographs as flexible and unstable concepts marked by stable signifiers, for him the 
ideograph is important for precisely this reason, the signifier is stable while that which is 
signified is unstable, as such they are “constitutive signs of American sociopolitical 
community.” (Condit, p. 18).  
All political discourse is built upon ideographic foundations,  
It is difficult to think of a political argument which is not grounded in the value  
represented by one or another ideograph…Because of the omnipresence  
of ideological value commitments at the inventional base of political  
argumentation, one option always open to advocates of special causes is a  
direct appeal to ideological abstraction (McGee, 1983, p. 110). 
 
Liberal democracy is founded upon ideological abstractions, McGee spent the bulk of his 
career studying prominent ideographs that are embedded into our political consciousness 
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as guiding principles in our democracy such as <liberty> and <the people>. The abstract 
nature of ideographs contribute to the way that they function in political discourse, “it is a 
safe bet that the most hostile competing factions will agree on the meaningfulness of such 
ideographs as 'property,' 'equality,' 'private,' and 'public' ” (1983, p.111). As a result of 
agreement over abstract ideals, political debates are marked not by the worthiness of 
particular ideologies, but rather the meaning and definitions of ideographic terms (111).  
Some approach ideographic rhetorical criticism through the identification of one 
particular text, or speech (Delgado, 1999) while others scour series of texts to identify 
ideographic discourses (Wander). Fernando Delgado analyzes the rhetoric of Fidel Castro 
through an ideographic lens in order to show how Castro is able to “articulate[s] a new 
consciousness for Cubans and an attempt to create a new social formation and praxis” (p. 
2). Identifying particular texts and analyzing them for ideological underpinnings is a 
viable method for rhetorical criticism. 
In his 1984 essay “The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy”, Philip Wander 
analyzes foreign policy rhetoric from three presidents during the cold war. In doing so, 
Wander is able to identify two ideographs that distinguish cold war foreign policy ideals 
from those guiding pre WWII foreign policy. Wander sees trends in the discourses that 
emerge out of the Whitehouse during the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations 
that he labels as the ideographs of technocratic realism and prophetic dualism. For 
Wander, criticism of this sort is part of a larger process of  “confronting technique with 
purpose, euphemism with reality, and silence—the threatened silence of future 
generations—with speech” (p. 357).  
 21 
This effort differs from those of Delgado and Wander in important ways. Delgado 
analyzes the rhetoric of Fidel Castro with a single artifact. Grounding ideographical 
analysis in a single artifact limits the possibility of uncovering the concrete histories of 
ideographs that McGee invests with great theoretical value. Wander's analysis is 
interesting and insigtful as to how to engage ideographic criticism, but rather than 
investigating a text to illuminate the meaning of an ideograph, Wander investigated 
several texts with the purpose of extracting foreign policy ideographs that were not 
already apparent before the criticism began. Because Condit has already done much work 
to establish the ideographic status of <choice>, this ideographic criticism of <choice> 
does not require the extraction of an ideograph as Wander's does. The ideograph of 
<choice> is already solidly established which allows this criticism to proceede in teasing 
out the origins and meanings of <choice>. This is accomplished by identifying and 
analyzing rhetorical artifacts that have contributed to the development and maintenance 
of the ideograph of <choice>. Once the ideals that ground the ideograph of <choice> are 
available, the critic can then compare the ideals it represents with the ideograph's ability 
to achieve the goals it seeks to --in this case, the ability to provide women with the right 
to legally terminate a pregnancy. 
If feminism is informed by the issue of reproductive autonomy which manifests 
itself as efforts to maintain the “right to choose” then an ideographic exploration of 
<choice> will undoubtedly reveal ideologies that are embedded in modern American 
feminism. For McGee, “The significance of ideographs is in their concrete history as 
usages, not in their alleged idea content” (McGee, 1980a p. 10). We live in the “era of 
<choice>” today’s young women belong to a generation of women who have never 
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known the illegality of abortion. The “alleged idea content” that McGee speaks of lies in 
the notion that abortion is available to all women who “choose” to obtain one. If the 
importance of an ideograph rests in its “concrete history as usages” as opposed its 
“alleged idea content” it becomes necessary to explore the reality of the choices women 
face in attempting to obtain an abortion. 
McGee elaborates on what he means by ideograph’s “concrete history as usages”:  
 
These ‘usages’ which we use to carry society within us are ‘material,’ not as a  
stone or a horse is ‘material,’ but in contrast to a paradigm drawn by idealists  
in which metaphysical terms, having no empirical referent, are said to  
have meaning measured by conditions in an imaginary (1980b, p. 45).  
 
An ideograph represents an ideal, imaginary or illusory reality that we strive to obtain. 
Our lived reality becomes contrasted off of the ideal represented in ideographs. To 
uncover what an ideograph both conceals and reveals, it is important to ask when, how 
and why ideographs are asserted rhetorically in particular situations? In his work on 
Liberty, Mcgee argues that we respond to our fears by establishing ideographs in which 
we have “romanticized our own normative commitments, reified them until many are 
convinced that ‘liberty’ is an objective state or condition which in name only adheres by 
fiat of definition to Anglo-American political systems” (1980b,p. 45). In doing so we 
become lulled into believing that political ideology is objective, but McGee reminds us 
that “’value-free’ thought is impossible  -- or, more accurately, that the illusion of 
ideology-free thought is as romantically fanciful and false as a fairy tale” (1983, p. 113). 
The challenge therefore in ideographic criticism is to uncover not only definitional 
debates, but to contrast the ideal world envisioned through the ideograph off of the ways 
in which the ideograph’s ideals are manifested in lived reality. In this project, this means 
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seeking to first identify what the ideal of <choice> means, and then to investigate the 
ability of women to enact that <choice>.  
McGee explains the theoretical structure of ideographs: 
In isolation, each ideograph has a history, an etymology, such that  
current meanings of the term are linked to past usages of it diachronically.  
The diachronic structure of an ideograph establishes the parameters, the  
category of its meaning. All ideographs taken together, I suggest, are  
thought at any specific ˝moment˝ to be consonant, related to one another  
in such a way as to produce unity of commitment in a particular historical  
context. Each ideograph is thus connected to all others as brain cells are  
linked by synapses, synchronically in one context at one specific  
moment (McGee, 1980, p. 16). 
 
Because ideographs have individual etymological histories it becomes necessary to trace 
their histories, to map their meanings over time. But, alone this is not enough because 
while ideographs come to constitute meaning in isolation, they are also related to other 
ideographic notions that vest them with meaning. This is particularly true in looking at 
ideographs that emerge from constitutional debates. Because <choice> arises from such 
constitutional debates it is intricately linked to other ideographs, such as <privacy> and 
<liberty>. For McGee there are three steps in the process of investigating such 
ideographic origins and meanings that will be employed in this analysis: 
(1) The isolation of a society's ideographs, (2) the exposure and analysis of  
the diachronic structure of every ideograph,and (3) characterization of  
synchronic relationhips among all the indeographs in a particular context  
(McGee, 1980a p. 16). 
 
 This project is an ideographic criticism of the notion of <choice> as it relates to 
the right of women to obtain abortions. This is accomplished through an excavation of 
attempts to define <choice> within various artifacts. In order to do this, a wide variety of 
artifacts have been selected for analysis all of which contribute to the construction and 
maintenance of the ideograph of <choice>. This criticism will evaluate legal documents 
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including the texts of legal arguments made before the Supreme Court and a number of 
the court's written decisions in cases central to abortion jurisprudence. Legal texts are 
important because constitutional questions are in essence ideological debates. The court 
must look to the ideographs set forth in the constitution and ask- does this concept 
<choice> relate to or connect to ideographs enumerated in the constitution? The 
particular cases analyzed here are, Roe, Maher, Harris and Webster Abortion 
jusriprudence is marked by hundreds of state and federal court cases that discuss the issue 
of abortion from many angles such as scientific questions surrounding fetal personhood, 
the state's interest in potential life, particular limitations states may attempt to impose 
upon abortion clinics, the legality of demonstrations at clinics,  are just a few.  The reason 
these cases are of particular interest to this study are because of their focus on defining 
and articulating <choice> as a constitutional right. While many of these cases brought  
multiple questions before the court, particular attention is paid to the individual holdings 
in decisions in which the right to choose is articulated, defined, and rooted in other higher 
order ideographs such as <privacy> and <liberty>.  
In addition, documents produced by Pro Choice social movement organizations 
will be analyzed including narratives gathered and published by Pro Choice advocates, 
and activist training manuals and guides will be analyzed.Two documents have been 
selected from a plethora of Pro-Choice material. Specifically, Choices a collection of 
narratives published in 1997. The book consists of a preface, introduction, and 12 stories 
of women who experienced abortion.  This document is important because it represents 
the ways in which women who have exercised the right to choose articulate its meaning 
and importance. The Second document produced by Pro-Choice advocates is Breaking 
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Barriers,  a ninety-eight page document produced by NARAL Pro-Choice America in 
2006 outlining issues surrounding reproductive rights of particular concern to women of 
color. Because Breaking Barriers is a document targeted at a population, rather than a 
single issue it addresses several issues. Breaking Barriers  presents reproductive rights 
issues pertinent to women of color along with strategies for how to organize what it calls 
“proactive policy campaigns”, to address these particular issues. As such, Breaking 
Barriers  is one of the longest and most diverse collection of problems and strategies for 
addressing them published by the organization. These documents have been selected 
because they represent the ways in which pro-choice organizations have picked up upon 
legal formulations of <choice> and deployed them within their organizations. Pro Choice 
usages of <choice> are isolated in this study because they represent usages of the 
ideograph that represent the “alleged idea content”. The rhetoric of Pro-Life 
organizations are omitted from this study because they do not represent an attempt to 
promote the ideograph in question, in addition because this study seeks to establish the 
effectiveness of <choice> in advancing the Pro-Choice agenda, pro-life rhetoric would be 
outside the scope of this study. 
While these texts are long and arduous, the sections for analysis are easily 
identifiable. In reading the decisions of the Supreme Court, only particular portions of 
each case directly relate to the way in which choice is constituted, defined, and drawn 
from higher order ideographs. For instance in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 
there are five questions before the court. Only one of those questions concerns the scope 
of the right to choose. Analyzing the Court’s rhetoric regarding fetal viability does not 
yield any insight into the constitutional basis for <choice>. The relevant portions of the 
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cases are easily identifiable in order to expedite analysis. The only document analyzed 
here that is not available in an electronic format is Choices. This document is an easy 
read, and while many of the stories articulate choice, many do not. Each story is not 
analyzed in this study; only those which attempt to define, and constitute <choice>. 
Finally, while Breaking Barriers is a large document (98 pages), searching the document 
electronically easily narrowed down its usage of <choice> to less than a dozen instances. 
Those instances are the focus of this analysis.  
In the process of analyzing these artifacts, special attention will be paid to the 
ways in which <choice> is characterized and defined as a stand alone right. Frequently, 
Pro Choice advocates fail to illustrate a concrete meaning of <choice>. In order to 
analyze the ways in which <choice> functions and is defined in leiu of concrete 
definitions, articulations of <choice> will need to be contextually extracted from the text 
because “one cannot strip rhetoric of its situation. We must see the document in its 
context as an intended instrument of persuasion” (McGee, 1980b, p. 31).  
In enacting this brand of ideographic rhetorical criticism each artifact will initially 
be read with an eye for an understanding of <choice> as an ideograph in its own right 
followed by an analysis of how <choice> comes to be understood over time, does its 
original idea content stand muster through its usages over time? In other words, is such 
an ideograph capable of fulfilling the normative goals it has come to represent? But most 
importantly, it becomes necessary to understand the connections between <choice> and 
other higher order ideographs. It is particularly important to analyze these connections if 
one is to study the synchronic relationships that exist between ideographs. Does the 
foundation of <choice> in these other ideographs vest it with a greater capacity to fulfill 
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its alleged idea content, or do these connections provide limitations upon the ability of 
<choice> to accomplish what it sets out to?   
 Sonja Foss articulates ideographic criticism as a form of ideological criticism in 
her book “Rhetorical Criticism” she articulates the importance of this form of criticism: 
The primary goal of the ideological critic is to discover and make visible  
the dominant ideology or ideologies embedded in an artifact and the  
ideologies that are being muted in it. Critic who discovers that the  
dominant ideology revealed in an artifact suppresses the voices of  
important interests or groups seeks to explicate the role of communication  
in creating and sustaining the suppression and to give voice to those  
interests. The ultimate aim of the ideological criticism as a result, is the  
emancipation of human potential that is being thwarted by an  
existing ideology or ideologies. (1996, p. 295-6) 
 
As such, it is not enough to extract definitional understandings of ideographs from 
various artifacts, but ideographic criticism must go further to uncover what or who is 
excluded from the assertion of a particular meaning. When ideologies are asserted in an 
attempt to reflect social values, they simultaneously contribute to the identity 
construction of the society they seek to represent. In so doing certain identities will be 
reflected while others may be excluded or made invisible. This is the aspect of 
ideographs that allows them to operate as “constitutive signs of American sociopolitical 
community” (Condit p.18) as well as markers of “the primary sites of battles for 
hegemony” (18). Indeed, the proccess of asserting particular ideologies that opreate to 
constitute identity has the potential to manifest those constructions in ways that exclude 
populations. When prominent political ideologies that shape our social reality prevent the 
inclusion of particular identities, this theoretical exclusion can manifest itself in material 
exclusion from the social reality that the ideograph seeks to create.  Therefore it is 
important in the duscussion portion of this criticism to explore the ways in which the 
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ideographic nature of <choice> targets particular polutations at the exclusion of others 
and to assess the societal impact of that exclusion. 
The goal of this study is to trace the diachronic development of <choice> as it 
emerges from the law and those who promote it, to identify synchronic relationships 
between <choice>and other ideographs, and to assess the limitations, if any of <choice> 
in  fulfilling its goal of ensuring that every woman has the right to obtain an abortion if 
they so choose one. . 
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CHAPTER 3 -  The Supreme Court’s Articulation of Choice 
Because ideographic criticism requires diachronic analysis, it is necessary to trace 
the historical emergence and evolution of the ideograph in question. For this reason, it is 
beneficial to explore the emergence of <choice> as a legal concept, particularly because 
<choice> did no emerge as an ideograph until the pro-choice movement adopted the 
rhetoric of the Court’s decision in Roe.  In so doing, four Supreme Court cases will be 
analyzed in an attempt to reveal the relationship of <choice> to other ideographs that 
function within our society and to explore the implications of those relationships upon the 
meaning and capacity of <choice>. 
What follows is an analysis of four abortion cases that have proven central to the 
legal definition of <choice>. After the establishment of the right to choose in Roe v. 
Wade, the subsequent cases of Maher v. Roe, Harris v. McRae and Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services questioned federal and state attempts to limit women’s 
access to abortion.  While many have read the right established in Roe as a constitutional 
entitlement, a diachronic investigation of the Court’s grounding of <choice> in <privacy> 
and <liberty> reveals that the right to choose hangs by a very loose constitutional thread 
because of the ideographic limitations of <liberty>.  
Roe v. Wade 
The first Supreme Court case to establish the “Right to Choose” was Roe v. Wade 
in 1972. A Texas woman (Jane Roe) challenged a Texas statute that prohibited a woman 
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from obtaining an abortion. Sarah Weddington, a young Austin lawyer, represented her. 
In order to evaluate the emergence of <choice> as a conceptual right from this case it is 
necessary to look at the ways in which <choice> was used not only by Weddington, but 
also by the state of Texas in the oral arguments made before the Supreme Court.  
 The notion of <choice> appears a dozen times in the official transcript of the oral 
argument before the Supreme Court in the Roe v. Wade hearing. The bulk of the 
discussion about <choice> (all but one reference) appears in the State’s response to the 
petitioner. In responding to Justice Stewart’s question regarding when a woman might be 
able to legally acquire an abortion in Texas, the state responded: 
Now I think she makes her choice prior to the time she becomes pregnant.  
That is the time of the choice. It's like, more or less, the first three or four  
years of our life we don't remember anything. But, once a child is born, a  
woman no longer has a choice, and I think pregnancy then terminates that  
choice. That's when. 
 
To which Justice Stewart responds “Maybe she makes her choice when she 
decides to live in Texas”. This scene is described by Sarah Weddington (1993) as one 
which drew laughter from the courtroom (p. 119-120). 
  Here <choice> is interpreted by the state as the decision a woman makes 
to become pregnant, in this context the decision to become pregnant is synonymous with 
the decision to have a child. Hence, the state of Texas articulates <choice> as something 
a woman has only until she becomes pregnant. The State’s attorney who sought to 
maintain the illegality of abortion initiated the language of <choice> in the oral argument 
of Roe v. Wade. It is here that one can begin to see the legal construction of the 
ideograph and the extent to which ideographs can be molded and manipulated as they 
become vested with meaning.  
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Contrary to popular belief, Jane Roe’s argument was not “I have a right to 
choose”. In her arguments for the right to obtain an abortion, Roe's lawyer, Sarah 
Weddington did not use the phrase “right to choose”, and she did not include the notion 
of <choice> in her discussion of a <privacy> justification for abortion. Raher, it was the 
State’s usage of the term <choice> that was adopted by the Supreme Court in writing 
their opinion in favor of Jane Roe. In coopting the State's use of the terminilogy of 
<choice>, the Supreme Court separated the concept of <choice> into two choices. The 
<choice> to become pregnant and the <choice> to have a child.    
The majority decision, written by Justice Blackmun, provides evidence that the 
court played a role in establishing the preeminence of the rhetoric of <choice> versus life 
in the abortion controversy. In siding with the appellant, the decision states that the Texas 
statutes “improperly invade a right, said to be possessed by the pregnant woman, to 
choose to terminate her pregnancy”(Roe v. Wade, 1973) . This statement separates the 
<choice> a woman makes to get pregnant from the <choice> a woman makes to 
terminate a pregnancy. Here <choice> is elevated to the status of a right. This lays the 
groundwork for <choice> to become elevated to ideographic status. Blackmun 
laboriously outlines the history of abortion jurisprudence and in so doing noting, “the 
opportunity to make this choice was present in this country well into the 19th century” 
(Roe v. Wade, 1973).  
Abortion is most strongly referred to as a <choice> when articulating that the 
“Ninth Amendment’s reservation of rights to the people is broad enough to encompass a 
woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. The detriment that the State 
would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent” 
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(Roe v. Wade, 1973). Here,  this particular synchronic usage of <choice> links it with 
other constitutional protections such as those enumerated in the Ninth Amendment. The 
emergence of this synchronic relationship in Roe, allows <choice> to become  embedded 
in the ninth amendment’s preservation of <privacy>. In writing his decision Justice 
Blackmun did not expand upon the notion of the constitutional protection of the right to 
<privacy> other than to say that it exists and that it protects a woman’s <choice> to 
terminate a pregnancy. This is significant because this lack of elaboration upon the 
meaning of <privacy> and its own synchronic relationship to higher order ideographs led 
pro-choice advocates to assume that this new right to choose was an ultimate right, void 
of limitations.  Several subsequent cases have challenged this “right to choose” and in so 
doing the court has been forced to be more articulate about it’s extraction of <choice> 
from <privacy>.  
Maher v. Roe 
In 1977 the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Maher v. Roe, a case that 
challenged a Connecticut statute that denied the use of state welfare funds to perform 
abortions. In this instance, a woman reliant upon state welfare funds desired an abortion 
but was unable to afford one because the state would not extend her welfare benefits to 
cover the procedure.  
In deciding this case, the Court expanded upon its grounding of the Right to 
Choose within the ninth and now the fourteenth amendments. In rearticulating the Roe 
decision Justice Powell wrote:  
Drawing on a group of disperate cases restricting government intrusion,  
physical coercion, and criminal prohibition of certain activities we concluded  
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty affords 
constitutional protection against state interference with certain aspects of an 
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individual’s personal “privacy” including a woman’s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy (Maher v. Roe, 1977) 
 
Here, <choice> is articulated as grounded in the right to be free from 
governmental intrusion upon an individual’s <privacy>. The court extracts <choice> 
from both <liberty> and <privacy> and lays the foundation for nearly all of the abortion 
jurisprudence that followed over the next thirty years. <choice> is painted here as a right 
to be free from interference in decision making, which the court was quick to point out as 
distinct from a right that entails an obligation on behalf of the government to ensure 
access to enacting that <choice>. Powell Continues: 
Roe did not declare an unqualified “constitutional right to an abortion,”  
as the district court seemed to think. Rather, the right protects the woman  
from unduly burdensome interference with her freedom to decide whether to 
terminate her pregnancy. It implies no limitation on the authority of a State to 
make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion, and to implement that 
judgment by the allocation of public funds (Maher v. Roe, 1977).  
 
 In Maher, the Supreme Court reversed a district court decision that would 
have required the state to fund abortions desired by indigent women who were unable to 
pay for them and upheld the Connecticut state statute that barred the use of public funds 
for abortions. In so doing, the court laid the groundwork for state restrictions upon 
abortions based upon the notion that <choice> is embedded in the right to be free from 
government intrusion, the court articulated that the state had no affirmative obligation to 
assist women in obtaining an abortion.  Here, the synchronic relationship between 
<choice>, <privacy>, and <liberty> impacts the ideographic capacity of <choice>. 
Because <choice> is derived from <liberty> it is subject to the inherent limitations of 
<liberty>.  It is in instances such as this that we can see how it is not enough to explore 
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the individual diachronic meanings of ideographs, rather it is in relationships to other 
ideographs that meaning and ideographic capacity emerges. 
Harris v. McRae 
 In 1976 Congress passed the Hyde Amendment. This legislation was 
essentially a national version of the Connecticut statute under scrutiny in Maher. The 
Hyde Amendment barred the use of any federal funds (i.e. Medicaid or welfare funds) for 
the attainment of an abortion; additionally it barred public hospitals that received public 
funds from performing abortions. In 1980 the Supreme Court heard and decided Harris v. 
McRae, a case that challenged the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment on the 
grounds that it violated the First, Fifth and Ninth Amendments of the constitution in that 
it limited funding of abortions while promoting and funding childbirth. “With regard to 
the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, the plaintiffs asserted, among other things, 
that the finding restrictions violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” (Harris v. McRae, 1980, p. 305). For the 
purposes of this analysis, the Religion Clause is not of significance in analyzing the 
ideograph of <choice> as it pertains to the right to obtain an abortion, however the Due 
Process Clause questions are of particular interest because this is where the synchronic 
relationship between <choice> and <liberty> is derived from.  
Justice Stewart wrote the majority decision in Harris. In his decision, Stewart 
discusses <choice> at length in clarifying the proceeding decisions of Roe and Maher and 
in articulating why the Hyde Amendment does not violate the constitution. In 
rearticulating the Court’s stance in Roe, Stewart notes that even though <privacy> is not 
explicitly articulated in the Bill of Rights, it is indeed protected as a <liberty> interest: 
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The constitutional underpinning of Wade was a recognition that the “liberty” 
 protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes  
not only the freedoms explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights, but also a 
freedom of personal choice in certain matters of marriage and family life. This 
implicit constitutional liberty, the Court in Wade held, includes the freedom of a 
woman to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy. (Harris v. McRae, 1980 p. 
312).  
 
This is the first decision in which the court explicitly articulates that the right to 
choose as a protected <liberty> interest is one that does not have a constitutional basis in 
the bill of rights, rather it is extracted from the Court’s interpretation of what <liberty> 
means.  
In Harris the court sided with the government and found that the Hyde 
Amendment did not represent a violation of constitutional rights. This is justified by 
returning to the Maher decision in “later cases—protecting a woman’s freedom of 
choice—did not translate into a constitutional obligation of Connecticut to subsidize 
abortions, the Court cited the basic difference between state interference with a protected 
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity” (Harris v. McRae, 1980 p. 
315). Here the Court is drawing a distinction between preventing a woman from 
obtaining abortion and promoting childbirth.  The ideographic capacity of <choice> 
changes drastically when the State determines that it will pay for childbirth, but not an 
abortion. Later in the decision Stewart clarifies this notion: 
It simply does not follow that a woman’s freedom of <choice> carries with it a 
constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full 
range of protected choices. The reason why was explained in Maher: although 
government may not place obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise of her 
freedom of choice, it need not remove those not of its own creation. Indigency 
falls in the latter category. The financial constraints that restrict an indigent 
woman’s ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of 
choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but 
rather of her indigency (Harris v. McRae, 1980 p. 316).  
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Here the Court is articulating that the government has no responsibility to provide 
a woman with choices that she cannot afford. While the government will protect 
<choice> by limiting the extent to which it can be taken away, the government is not 
obligated to ensure access to <choice>. The legal basis for this is because <liberty> does 
not entail an affirmative government obligation, Stewart also notes, that “nothing in the 
Due Process Clause supports such an extraordinary result” (Harris v. McRae, 1980 p. 
317).  
 Because <choice> was established in Roe as a <privacy> right protected 
as a <liberty> interest, <choice> can only manifest itself as a negative right—a right to be 
free from governmental intrusion. This provides a legal justification for limiting the 
extent to which the most vulnerable members of our society are able to exercise that 
right. Because indigency is not a condition created by the State, there is no obligation on 
behalf of the state to enhance the choices available to indigent women. It is here that 
serious implications of the synchronic relationship between <choice> and <liberty> can 
be derived. It is here that the alleged idea content of <choice> as an ultimate right to 
obtain an abortion manifests itself as such only for those who can afford to avail 
themselves of that right. The “material reality” McGee speaks of is that large portions of 
the population are left with the <choice> that the State will assist them in making. For 
pregnant women, this means the <choice> to have a child, in later chapters we will 
discuss how this implicates state sponsored sterilization programs targeted at specific 
populations who are unable to exercise their <choice> outside of those which the State 
will assist them in making.  
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services 
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Reliance upon the interpretation of <liberty> as a negative right arises again in 
1989’s Webster v. Reproductive Health Services. This case concerned a 1986 Missouri 
statute consisting of 20 provisions, five of which were challenged in the Supreme Court. 
One of those provisions was to prohibit “the use of public employees or facilities to 
perform or assist abortions not necessary to save the mother’s life, and it prohibits the use 
of public funds, employees, or facilities for the purpose of ‘encouraging or counseling’ a 
woman to have an abortion not necessary to save her life” (Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Services, 1989, p. 501). This instance differs slightly from the previously 
questioned Connecticut statute and the Hyde Amendment because those instances 
pertained to the use of state or federal funds only, the Missouri statute went a step further 
mandating that state facilities and employees cease advising women to have abortions 
unless pregnancy were life threatening.  
In evaluating the constitutionality of this particular provision of the Missouri 
statute, the court once again relied on the negative nature of the constitutional <liberty> 
guarantee in Rehnquist’s written decision. “The Due Process Clauses generally confer no 
affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure 
life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the 
individual” (Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 1989, p. 507). While the 
government may not take away one’s <liberty>, there is no obligation to ensure it. 
Rehnquist strays away from using the term <choice> too much in this decision, 
mentioning <choice> as it pertains to pregnancy in the decision when he states that “it is 
difficult to see how any procreational <choice> is burdened by the state’s ban on the use 
of its facilities or employees for performing abortions” (p. 510), and again “Missouri’s 
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refusal to allow public employees to perform abortions in public hospitals leaves a 
pregnant woman with the same choices as if the State had chosen not to operate any 
public hospitals at all” (p. 509). Because the state has no obligation to provide health care 
in the form of public hospitals, the state certainly has no obligation to utilize them to 
perform abortions. Because <liberty> is only a protection from state intervention and 
does not provide an obligation, there is no jurisdictional mandate for state sponsored 
health care, much less abortions.  
Reading the four Supreme Court cases of Roe, Maher, McRae, Harris, and 
Webster in an attempt to diachronically trace the development of <choice> and its 
synchronic relationships with other higher order ideographs such as <privacy> and 
<liberty> reveals the extent to which ideographs that begin as abstractions, such as 
<choice> did in Roe with Blackmun’s failure to elaborate upon the constitutional 
grounding of <choice> as a <privacy> right shift over time as their synchronic 
relationships to other ideographs (<liberty>) become fleshed out. In this process the critic 
can begin to identify populations that are excluded from the ideologies these ideographs 
emerge from. Hence, the relevance of this sort of study poses for communication scholars 
becomes more evident, as Foss indicates, the critic “discovers that the dominant ideology 
revealed in the artifact suppresses the voices of important interest groups” (1996, p. 295). 
It is the role of the communication scholar to “give voice to those interests” (p. 296). The 
analysis of these four cases reveals the extent to which the dominant ideology of 
<choice> excludes those whom the court identifies as indigent women. For indigent 
women, the options available to them under the guise of <choice> are only those 
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<choices> that the State is interested in providing, and for the majority of these women 
their only reasonable <choice> is childbirth. 
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CHAPTER 4 - Pro-Choice Rhetoric and the Usage of <choice> 
Investigating ideographic usages of <choice> requires the analysis of the ways in 
which the rhetoric of <choice> is deployed by those who advocate and promote its 
ideographic status. Because pro-choice advocates uphold the ideographic status of 
<choice> as a constitutional right, any investigation of <choice> as an ideograph must 
include the ways in which pro-choice advocates deploy <choice> rhetoric. The ideal 
rhetoric for analysis is that which emerges from the organization that includes the 
rhetoric of <choice> in its title,  NARAL Pro-Choice America. Originally the National 
Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws (NARAL), this organization was active in 
attempts to legalize abortion before Roe. Since 1973, NARAL has been on the forefront 
of efforts to organize Pro-Choice Americans in order to ensure that the right to obtain an 
abortion remains available to all women. Changing its name to the National Abortion 
Rights Action Leage to represent the legalization of abortion after Roe,  the mission of 
NARAL became:  
to develop and sustain a constituency that uses the political process to guarantee 
every woman the right to make personal decisions regarding full range of 
reproductive choices including preventing unintended pregnancy, bearing healthy 
children and choosing legal abortion (naral.org) 
 
In its attempt to represent this mission, NARAL engages in several activities. It produces 
a variety of publications distributed to its membership, from  recruitment documents to 
documents prepared for and to promote litigation.   NARAL works to promote its mission 
by targeting geographic regions, particular populations, and in an issue specific manner 
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all at once.  In 2003, in order to better articulate the Pro-Choice stance of the 
organization, the phrase "Pro- Choice America" was added to NARAL's moniker, making 
the orgalization's full name National Abortion Rights Action Leage Pro-Choice America, 
better known as NARAL Pro-Choice America.  
 The following ideographic investigation into the rhetoric of NARAL Pro-Choice 
America focuses on two of the organization's publications. One is a collection of 
women's stories about their attempts to obtain an abortion that includes an introduction 
and an abbreviated history of the right to <choose> written by NARAL. The second 
document represents an activist manual and tool-kit targeted towards activating women 
of color to support the NARAL Pro-Choice America agenda. Each of these documents 
deploys the rhetoric of <choice> in a different manner than the other, and in a far 
different manner than the ways in which the Supreme Court has articulated  
In reading these artifacts, attention is paid to the instances in which <choice> is 
envoked to express the right to obtain an abortion. Once these instances are located, the 
analysis attempts to derive what is meant by <choice> from the context in which the 
usage arises. Most importantly, this analysis seeks to identify and assess the instances in 
which choice is or is not associated with other ideographs and the ways in which these 
relationships (or lack there of) shape the ideographic nature of <choice>.  
Choices 
In 1985 NARAL Pro-Choice America (then NARAL) began the "Women Speak 
Out" campaign in which "women across the nation spoke publicly about their abortion 
experiences" (Choices, 1997, p. 7). An outgrowth of this campaign was Choices- Women 
Speak About Abortion,  a collection of narratives published in 1997. The book consists of 
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a preface, introduction, and 12 stories of women who experienced abortion. The twelve 
stories all represent different experiences, six of the stories are of women who obtained 
abortions before it became legal in 1973,  the story of one teenage girl, Becky Bell who 
obtained an illegal abortion in 1988 after she became aware that she would be unable to 
obtain a legal abortion without the consent of her parents, three stories of women 
obtaining legal abortions, and two stories that tell of the experience of women who 
obtained an abortion after learning that their children would be unable to survive, or 
seriously disabled. Many of the women who tell these stories express the importance of 
the right to <choose> in their lives. The introduction and overarching NARAL narrative 
of reproductive history that reads on the bottom of each page  is a particularly interesting 
text for analysis. Beginning on the first page, several sentences are contained on the 
bottom of each page. The Introduction asks the reader to read the narratives and then go 
back and read the contextualization of reproductive history on the bottom of each page. 
This particular text sheds insight as to the ways in which <Choice> is ideographically 
deployed by Pro-Choice advocates. These stories provide greater comprehension of 
individual women's interpretations of <choice>, and the ways in which <choice> 
becomes vested with meaning for women who seek to obtain abortions.  
For the purposes of analysis this text is devided into three portions based upon 
their functions in the document. The first portion of the document is the Introduction. 
This serves to situate the rest of the text within the context of promoting the agenda of 
NARAL Pro-Choice America. The second portion of the document contains the 
narratives, or individual stories told by women who have obtained abortions. This portion 
serves to ground the  agenda of NARAL Pro-Choice America in the experiences of 
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individual women. The third portion of the text is described in a note to readers at the 
very beginning of the text as an overarching "historical narrative" that connects the 
individual narratives with the "broader struggle for reproductive rights in the United 
States". Each of these portions of the text will be analyzed separately with regard to the 
function they serve in the text.  
The introduction to the text was written by Karen A. Schneider, president of 
NARAL at the time of publication. In framing the context for the narratives that will 
follow, Schneider discusses <choice> in the greater context of women's equality, "The 
ability to decide when to bear a child—and when not to—is essential for women's full 
emancipation and participation in society. Without the freedom to choose, women's 
march toward equality would have stalled long ago" (Choices, 1997, p. 6). Here <choice> 
is less defined, rather, Schneider is vesting <choice> with ideographic power through 
abstraction. This is an instance where an abstract ideograph is evoked in what McGee 
calls "struggles for hegemony". In this instance the struggle for hegemony being invoked 
in the ideograph of <choice> is the struggle of women to participate in society equally to 
men. This quote elevates <choice> to a central tenet of feminist struggles for equality. 
Simultaneously, <choice> is not defined The ideographic meaning of <choice> is 
assumed while its importance in terms of the emancipation of women is stressed. While 
the text is entitled Choices there is little done to ground the concept and explain its 
meaning, rather it is abstracted and held esteemed as a "fundamental American value, a 
cardinal principle, and a constitutionally protected right" (p. 6).  
The implication of situating <choice> within such terminology as "fundamental 
American value", "cardinal principal", or a "constitutionally protected right" is to 
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construct <choice> ideographically as McGee phrases as " a higher order abstraction 
representing collective commitment to a particular but equivocal and ill-defined 
normative goal" (McGee, 1980a, p. 15). Here, <choice> is not necessarily defined, rather 
it is abstracted as it is described as synonymous with higher order abstractions such as 
American values, principals and constitutional rights. This is an instance of the 
expression of a syllogistic relationship, a usage of an ideograph deployed alongside 
others. The articulation of the relationship  between <choice> and these normative goals 
is not specified. <Choice> is posited as value free discourse in a world in which values, 
principles, and constitutionality are concepts that are undebatable in American society. 
The introduction to this collection of stories entitled Choices, and ostensibly about 
<choice> does very little to convey the meaning of <choice> to the reader. This  lays the 
groundwork for a text that treats <choice> as a higher abstraction loaded with what 
McGee calls "alleged idea content".  
The personal narratives included in the text Choices have for the purposes of this 
analysis been devided into two categories. First are those that do not use the terminology 
of <choice>. These stories tell of women's experiences with abortion, but do not refer to 
the right to obtain an abortion as the right to choose. The women who tell these stories 
do, at times, refer to the legalization of abortion but they do not attach the right to obtain 
an abortion to the ideograph of <choice>.  Second are those narratives that discuss the 
value of <choice> but do not specifically define <choice>. Several of the stories in the 
book do not elaborate on what <choice> necessarily means to the individuals telling the 
stories. Instead of vesting <choice> with meaning, the authors of these narratives vest it 
 45 
with power. Many stories conclude with women articulating the importance of <choice> 
in their lives without an explanation of its meaning.  
In the first category are the stories of women's experiences with abortion that do 
not use the terminology of <choice>. Lynn Kahn's story of seeking out an illegal abortion 
after having been raped in an alley way after work is one of the most gruesome stories of 
illegal abortion included in the collection of stories. This narrative tells of seeking out an 
abortionist who came to Kahn's home.  
 
She asked me to lie down on the bed. She took a long rubber orange tube  
out of a bag, put it in one of my kitchen pan, fillied it with water, and boiled  
it on the stove to sterilize it. When it was cool enough for her to touch, she  
inserted the tube in me, and told me to lie on my back for the next 24 hours. 
 She said she would come back to my apartment the next morning to remove  
the tube and see if everything was alright…….the woman came back the next  
day. She said she was going to remove the tube and I would probably have  
some bleeding. It wasn't painful, but then the blood started to come out fast.  
Her eyes got really big, and she left quickly (p. 14) 
 
Kahn's story continues by retelling her attempt to seek medical treatment after the woman 
left. At the first hospital she went to, she was turned away, at the second hospital she was 
admitted and placed in a room with police guards and other patients who had broken the 
law.  This particular narrative does not discuss the legalization of abortion, or <choice>.   
Carol Wall tells her story of seeking an abortion in 1966 after she found out she 
was pregnant for the fifth time in six years. Her story tells of how she traveled to Puerto 
Rico to seek an abortion. The story does not mention <choice> at all, however it does 
conclude with a reference to the right to obtain an abortion "About seven years later, Roe 
v. Wade was handed down. It was one of the most wonderful moments of my life. I had 
such a feeling of freedom-it was like a release from slavery" (p. 23).   In this instance, 
Wall uses an incredibly strong analogy in discussing the leaglization of abortion. She 
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likens it to being freed from slavery. For her, the right to obtain an abortion is as much a 
victory for women's rights as the abolition of slavery was for black Americans. This 
analogy tells the reader how important the right to obtain an abortion is to Carol Wall, but 
in so doing the right to obtain an abortion is not elaborated as the right to choose.  
Shannon Lee Dawdy recounts her narrative of aborting a fetus with anencephaly.  
 
The neonatologist didn't mince words. He called it anencephaly, a neural tube 
defect in which the skull doesn't close and the brain tissue cannot form normally. 
He said that these babies, if they are born alive, don't libe more than three days. 
That sealed my decision. Through my tearsm I said I would terminate the 
pregnancy (p. 42) 
 
In Dawdy's case, she was subject to Lousiana informed consent and mandatory waiting 
period statutes. These laws, require women to be informed of all of their options before 
agreeing to have an abortion. "I was supposed to calmly read all this information- anti-
choice propaganda, really- and sign my name to each item. There were a couple of lines 
about adoption which, or course, was totally irrelevant in my case" (p. 43).  Dawdy does 
not refer to choice, except in her identification of "anti-choice propaganda" and "anti-
choice legislation". She does not discuss the importance of the right to choose, nor does 
she elaborate upon what <choice> means to her. One could assume that the purpose for 
the inclusion of this story is to give the perspective of a woman who wanted to have a 
child, but became pregnant with a fetus that was incompatable with life. For her, the parts 
of her experience that yeild importance are not about how important the right to choose 
is, rather the ways in which "anti-choice" laws inconvenienced her.  
 Byllye Avery is the founder of the National Black Women's Health Project. Her 
story of a safe, legal, unemotional abortion is perhaps the most sterile story included in 
the text.  
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Before the procedure, the nurse said, 'you might have all kinds of feelings  
when it is over, you may cry a lot and we'll be here to support you.' I did not 
react that way. Instead, I felt a sense of relief when it was over…..To me, 
abortion means stopping a potential life. It would be dishonest for me to say that 
this is not live tissue. When you prevent conception, you are also preventing a 
potential life. Abortion is an extension of that prevention. That's the way I see it. 
(p. 47) 
 
Avery does not reference abortion as <choice>. She does not talk about the importance of 
the right to obtain an abortion. Avery does not elaborate on her abortion experience the 
way some other women do, she is very matter of fact.  
 These particular stories do not explicitly endorse the langauge of <choice>. They 
are stories about women's experiences with abortion, but there is nothing rhetorically 
connecting them to this notion of <choice> that has lent itself as the title of the collection, 
Choices. There are however, several stories that do deploy the rhetoric of <choice>. In so 
doing most of these stories do not yeild any greater understanding of the meaning and 
scope of <choice>, rather they illuminate the value those telling the stories adhere to 
<choice>.   
Polly Bergen, who obtained an illegal abortion during the 1940's concludes her 
narrative with:  
The government should never have a choice regarding a woman's right to  
choose. It is a choice that should be made personally by a woman with her 
husband, her family, her priest, her minister, her rabbi, or just within her own 
heart. In the end, a woman has to decide what is the right choice for her at that 
moment in time. If you can't trust a woman with a choice, how can you trust her 
with a child? (Bergen, Choices, 1997, p. 12) 
 
This editorialization posits <choice> as a personal decision in which the 
government should not intervene. Bergen is not explicitly articulating <choice> as a 
privacy concern, however privacy can be inferred in her statement. Bergen's claim is that 
the government should have no right to intervene. Articulating an ideograph as <choice> 
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in this manner makes it appear as if it's not a legal concept, but a personal decision. 
<Choice> is posited here as a thing that a woman can possess as opposed to a more 
abstract value, or principle as Shcneider had elevated it to in the introduction. 
Ideographically, Bergen identifies <choice>  as a concept that stands by itself, without 
resting upon other ideographs.  
Many women who tell their stories simply state that they are proudly Pro-Choice 
replicating the editorialization of Polly Bergen. For instance, Mary Roper tells her story 
of having been date raped in college and seeking out an illegal abortion. Her story does 
not make reference of <choice> until the last paragraph: 
It is my hope and prayer that the right to choose will never be taken away.  
And these days it seems like a possibility. We must have freedom to make  
our own reproductive choices and access to counseling and support. Looking  
back, I can say that despite my experiences, I was one of the lucky ones. I  
survived; others did not. I tell my story for them, so that no woman will ever  
have to repeat my journey  Choices, 1997, p. 19 
 
 
 This is the extent of many of their references to <choice>; however, one story in 
particular describes <choice> as something a woman posesses in much the same way 
Bergen articulates <choice>. Jennifer Nye, who obtained a safe legal abortion in New 
Hampshire during the 1980's reflected upon the experience of a teenager's story that is 
also told in this collection of stories. Becky Bell died in 1989 of an infection that was the 
result of an illegal abortion she obtained in Indiana because she was too ashamed to seek 
the consent of her parents (which the state of Indiana required of all minors seeking 
abortion). In comparing her situation to that of Becky Bell, Jennifer Nye states that "the 
only difference between us was luck and geography. She lived in a state where she had to 
tell her parents and I did not. She died for her choice. I did not".  This is an awkward 
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usage of <choice> in which it is clear that the <choice> to obtain an abortion is not 
available to all women, yet Becky Bell still made a <choice>. Becky Bell exercised her 
<choice>, but a law determined the way in which her <choice> manifested itself. 
<Choice> is not only constituted by the right to obtain a safe legal abortion, but for 
Becky Bell, her action in the face of her inability to obtain a safe legal abortion also 
constitute enacting a <choice>. Whereas Schneider and Bergen posit <choice> as the 
ability to obtain an abortion via a constitutional right, Nye describes Becky Bell's 
inability to exercise this right as an enactment of <choice> . Here <choice>  exists 
simultaneously within and in opposition to its alleged idea content. This is how the 
ideograph becomes an "ill defined normative goal" as a result of its abstraction. 
A note to readers at the very beginning of Choices instructs the reader about how 
to go about reading this document.  
We invite you to experience the lives of one dozen women in this book as they 
make the intensely personal and profound decision about abortion. After you have 
read their stories, please go back and read the historical narrative that places their 
experiences in the broader struggle for reproductive rights in the United States. 
The narrative begins on page 9 and continues across the bottom of each page.   
 
Like a continuous footer, this larger contextualizing narrative serves as the diachronic 
articulation of the development and evolution of <choice> over time. Serving the 
function McGee identifies as establishing the "perameters" of an ideograph (McGee, 
1980, p. 16). In and of themselves, the stories don’t make the leap to the ideograph of 
<choice>. The stories represent synchronic usages of <choice>. The contextualization of 
these stories within the larger diachronic articulation of <choice> through the narrative of 
“the broader struggle for reproductive rights” is what binds the individual experiences 
together as ideographic expressions of <choice>.  
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 This narrative differs from the others. This is not a personal story of one woman’s 
experience told in the first person. This narrative is a third person attempt to generalize 
about the history of all women’s reproductive rights. And, it is through this broader 
narrative that the 12 individual stories in this collection are contextualized and associated 
with the pro-choice message.  
 This narrative itself does not invoke the language of <choice> with great 
frequency. But there are some striking usages that should be pointed out. The narrative 
begins with the sentence, “Throughout U.S. history, a woman’s fundamental right to 
choose has never been fully realized” (9). The notion that <choice> has never been fully 
realized propels it into ideographic status. It is immediately, an ideal, a goal, something to 
strive for.  
The narrative continues by discussing the status of women in the 19th century, 
referring to the Comstock Act (although, not by name) that made it illegal for information 
about birth control to be distributed via the United States Postal Service.  And moves into 
a lengthy analysis of the status of women’s reproductive rights in the post World War II 
era until 1973 when the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade. In discussing this event, 
the narrative states that, “Roe was a careful compromise, recognizing a woman’s 
constitutional right to choose abortion up to fetal viability” (26).  This codifies the 
assumption that Roe’s establishment of the right to legally obtain an abortion is 
synonymous with the “right to choose”. However, in discussing the legalization and 
availability of abortions, this narrative rarely engages the rhetoric of <choice>, rather 
most frequent usages of the rhetoric of “choice” manifest themselves in identification of 
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anti-abortion activists and measures. “Roe” is used as “right to choose” and “anti-choice” 
is used to mean “anti-abortion”.  For instance: 
But after a quarter century of legal abortion, the promise of Roe remains 
unfulfilled. Although the freedom to choose endures as a legal right, anti-choice 
activism and subsequent Supreme Court decisions have increased government 
regulation of abortion and made abortion less accessible. (30) 
 
 Again:  
 
Anti-choice forces mobilized immediately after Roe and executed a 




The same year, opponents of choice demonstrated their political clout by helping 
elect a president who packed the federal courts and the Supreme Court with 
judges opposed to Roe. (32-33) 
 
This move of only using <choice> in the negative sense, referring to those who are 
opposed to <choice> rather than affirming that <choice> has meaning contributes to 
abstracting <choice> as a higher ideographic ideal. <Choice is made out to be something 
that is good and desirable, yet threatened and in jeopardy.  
 The reader is told to read this contextualizing narrative last, after having read the 
individual stories of women that are included. As a result individual experiences become 
endowed with clear ideographic purpose.  The overarching narrative enables the 
individual narratives to become part of the diachronic development of the ideograph of 
<choice>, while the individual experiences represent experiences and manifestations of 
<choice> that have not been synchronically linked with other ideographic ideals. The 
individual experiences expressed in this document become part of the larger historical 
development of <choice> as an ideographic ideal via the grand narrative of women’s 
reproductive rights that the reader is to read at the end.  
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Breaking Barriers 
Breaking Barriers is a ninety-eight page document produced by NARAL Pro-
Choice America in 2006 outlining issues surrounding reproductive rights of particular 
concern to women of color. NARAL Pro-Choice America freely offers many documents 
that are issue specific, designed to assist people in advancing the Pro-Choice agenda of 
the organization. Because Breaking Barriers is a document targeted at a population, 
rather than a single issue it addresses several issues. Breaking Barriers  presents 
reproductive rights issues pertinent to women of color along with strategies for how to 
organize what it calls “proactive policy campaigns”, to address these particular issues. As 
such, Breaking Barriers  is one of the longest and most diverse collection of problems 
and strategies for addressing them published by the organization. Even as such, the entire 
document only references <choice> a few times. The fact that Breaking Barriers is so 
long, with so few references (less than 10) to <choice>, or the right to choose is a 
reflection of the tendency of NARAL Pro-Choice America to elevate <choice> to an 
abstraction in order to maintain its alleged idea content.  
The first section of the document is entirely devoted to defining a proactive policy 
campaign with tips about how to organize and build coalitions. This is the section of the 
document with the most references to <choice>. Usages of the term are minor, for 
example in bullet pointing the reasons why proactive policy campaigns are good it is 
explained that these campaigns serve to “provide a platform to better define and articulate 
pro choice values and principles”, to “expand [the] base of pro-choice volunteers” and 
“give pro-choice policy makers something to support”(2006 p.1). Pro-Choice in these 
terms are abstract groupings of people and ideas. Here, <pro-choice> is an ideographic 
stance that represents particular values and principles, yet what those values and 
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prrinciples are is left undefined. In such an abstraction, <choice> is value laden with 
neutral value meaning. Values and principles are to be held in esteem, but what they 
mean or constitute is not directly articulated in reference to <choice>.  Pro-Choice policy 
makers, are a group of people who adhere to pro-choice values, but what constitutes one 
as a pro-choice policy maker? Who are these people? It is as if a certain familiarity with 
“pro-choice values” is assumed about the reader of the document and that grounding 
those values in a synchronic relationship with other values ro principles is unecessary. 
Clearly NARAL is attempting to invoke a relationship between <choice> and other 
ideographs, but the failure to specify them beyond an illusion to <choice> being value 
laden maintains an abstract notion of what it  means to embrace <choice>. But McGee 
reminds us that ideographs should not only be  explored in isolation, but also "related to 
one another in such a way as to produce unity of commitment in a particular historical 
context.” (1980a, p. 16).  The references to pro-choice values elude to synchronic 
relationships between <choice> and other ideographs, but above and beyond revealing 
that such relationships exist, the nature of these relationships are left undefined in this 
instance of the rhetoric of pro-choice advocates. Clearly for pro-choice advocates, 
<choice> is not devoid of meaning, it means a great deal to them, however their ability to 
articulate that meaning in the context of this document is troubling. If the purpose of this 
document is to to provide a "platform to better define and articulate pro choice values and 
principles” (Breaking Barriers, 2006, p.1), it does not achieve that goal. Instead, Breaking 
Barriers does little to better define pro-choice values, it merely abstracts <choice> to the 
extent that almost all we know about it is that it is associated in some way with values 
and principles. 
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Increasing the level of <choice> abstraction, the manual articulates that 
“Promoting public funding for abortion demonstrates the fundamental pro-choice 
principle that the right to choose an abortion is meaningless without the ability to carry 
out that decision” (2006 p. 60). Here, one of the "principles" alluded to earlier is 
articulated as not only the right to obtain an abortion, but the ability to actually obtain 
one. This statement is a contribution to abstraction because it does not explain what gives 
pro-choice values meaning; rather it illustrates how pro-choice values can be rendered 
meaningless.  . A fundamental principle of <choice> for NARAL is the ability to enact it. 
That an ideograph would only be vested with meaning if it were obtainable in the first 
place is an interesting principle of an ideograph. Rather than grounding an ideograph in a 
synchronic relationship with other ideographs, here, <choice> is grounded in its ability to 
manifest itself. The ability to carry out <choice> intimates that an individual must 
possess the agency necessary to do so.  According to this usage of <choice>, such an 
ability is hindered because of a lack of public funding. Hence, the denial public funding 
for abortion is an example of one of the ways in which <choice> becomes devoid of 
meaning.  This causes one to return to the concerns of Sonja Foss, that the rhetorical 
critic must not simply reveal the ideologies embedded in an artifact, but also reveal those 
that are muted in the process (1996, p. 295). In this case who is excluded from the 
"ability to carry out that decision"?  For whom does <choice> become meaningless as a 
result of the issue of the lack of public funding? 
Answering this question requires investigating the nature of funding bans and 
who in particular is affected. The denial of public funding is a direct result of the Hyde 
Amendment. Poor women who rely on the government for healthcare experience the 
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meaninglessness of <choice> that arises from the lack of federal funding articulated in 
Breaking Barriers. While for NARAL, the inability to enact <choice> renders it 
meaningless, therer are others who agree with this sentiment, “the Hyde Amendment 
effectively allows the state to make the woman’s choice for her. If she cannot afford an 
abortion, she cannot seek an abortion. If she cannot seek an abortion, she cannot choose 
an abortion” (Berenknopf, 1997 p. 673). For many, The era of <choice> is marred by the 
Hyde Amendment’s implicit denial of <choice> through the elimination of avenues of 
access to abortion.Julie Kay (1994) explains the predicament that a woman who relies on 
Medicaid faces when seeking an abortion: 
Denial of Medicaid funding curtails access to abortion for low-income women  
and may completely bar them from the power to choose abortion. Worse, it  
propels them to even more desperate "choices": facing the risk of an  
inexpensive illegal abortion or the danger of trying to self-abort. Other  
alternatives include attempting to raise funds for an abortion, going without  
food or other necessities, or putting one's health at risk by carrying  
the unwanted or unsafe pregnancy to term (p. 351).  
 
It is undeniable that this lack of <choice> is felt most by low-income women of color. 
This impact on low-income women of color has been described as part and parcel with  
"stigmatization, racism, school segregation, and cycles of poverty” (Daly, 1995 p. 113). 
As a result of the denial of public funding for abortion, women in the United States are 
divided into two classes, those who can choose and those who cannot. It just so happens 
to be that the majority of those who do not enjoy the right to choose are the poorest and 
most stigmatized members of our society. For these women, <choice> is nothing more 
than an illusion, or as Breaking Barriers suggests, meaningless.      
 While analysis of the usage of <choice> rhetoric in Choices reveals the 
extent to which abstracted ideographs without synchronic linkages contributes to the 
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establishment of normative goals that are ill defined, it also becomes evident that 
<choice> is not a normative goal that is attainable to all. In positing <choice> as a 
constitutional right, the denial of which denies core American values, the extent to which 
millions are excluded from the ability to exercise such rights are obscured from the 
conversation. Breaking Barriers reveals a certain awareness on the part of NARAL Pro-
Choice America, that for particular populations, <choice> is in fact meaningless as a 
result of restrictions on funding. However, <choice> is maintained in the rhetoric of 
NARAL Pro-Choice America as a higher order concept that has to potential to avail 
everyone of its alleged idea content, namely the ability to obtain a legal abortion. These 
pro-choice advocates stress that <choice> has the capability of fulfilling its role, but that 
more action must be taken by constituents to work towards establishing <choice> as a 
right capable of ensuring all women have the ability and right to obtain a legal abortion.    
 Reading Choices and Breaking Down Barriers from the perspective of an 
ideographic rhetorical critic reveal the extent to which pro-choice advocates seek to 
establish <choice> as deeply rooted in American values while simultaneously abstracting 
<choice> in a way that provides no insight as to the extent to which synchronic 
relationships with other ideographs contribute to the meaning of <choice>. Indeed, even 
when the stated goal of a rhetorical act is to better define pro-choice values, as is the case 
with Breaking Down Barriers, the reader is left with a better idea of what renders 
<choice> meaningless, than what vests it with meaning. What can be garnered from this 
analysis is that even for pro-choice advocates, <choice> is hollow as long as there are 
obstacles in the path of those who attempt to enact their right to choose in attempting to 
obtain an abortion.  
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CHAPTER 5 -  Results and Discussion 
This project addresses the primary research question: Does the relation between 
the ideographic status of Choice to that of privacy provide a productive rhetorical 
mechanism for ensuring that all women have access to reproductive rights?  Engaging in 
an ideographic rhetorical criticism of the usage of <choice> in the law and prominent 
pro-choice rhetoric yields findings that have implications on three independent levels. 
First, this analysis reveals much about the sustainability of the legal justification for 
abortion in America. Second, this criticism tells us about the ability of the pro-choice 
movement to achieve its own goals given its reliance upon the ideograph of <choice>.  
And, finally, this analysis implicates the method of ideographic criticism and opens up 
questions about McGee’s focus on analyzing ideographs as both diachronic and 
synchronic usages of ideals.  
Legal Implications 
Analyzing the diachronic development of <choice> as a legal concept through the 
four cases presented here reveals that <choice> is derived from <privacy> and that the 
right to <privacy> is emanates from the liberty interest articulated in the Due Process 
Clause of the constitution.  In Roe, Maher, Harris, and Webster, it is clear that the 
Supreme Court interprets <liberty> as the right to be free from government interference. 
As such, <liberty> is expressed as a negative right, rather than a positive right in which 
the government has an obligation to assist a citizen in availing themselves of that right. 
As a negative right to be free from government interference, the Supreme Court, in all 
three cases, Maher, Harris, and Webster invoke this interpretation of <liberty> as the 
justification for the denial of funding for abortions. The rhetoric of pro-choice advocates 
 58 
surrounding choice obscures the relationship between <choice> and <liberty> by 
abstracting notions of <choice> as commensurate with “American values” without 
directly connecting <choice> with <liberty>. While advocates of <choice> do not 
explicitly tie their usage of <choice> with an assertion of liberty, they do note that the 
denial of funding renders <choice> meaningless. It appears as if pro-choice advocates 
know that <liberty> renders <choice> incapable of achieving its goal of ensuring every 
woman has the ability to access an abortion if necessary and therefore refrain from 
making direct connections between <choice> and <liberty> in their deployment of 
<choice> rhetoric. The most interesting result is that advocates of <choice> may be 
aware of its limitations, but continue to advance the alleged idea content of <choice> that 
they hold as an ideal.  
Sonja Foss suggests that rhetorical criticism has the capacity to “discover and 
make visible the dominant ideology or ideologies embedded in an artifact and the 
ideologies that are being muted in it" (1996, p. 295). As such a criticism, the ideographic 
analysis of the rhetoric of <choice> this study engages in has undoubtedly uncovered 
embedded ideologies at play in the deployment of <choice> as a political right. <Choice> 
has been synchronically linked to other ideographs that shape the parameters of its 
meaning in such a way that its ability to fulfill the alleged idea content that proponents of 
its expression invest it with are cut short. Primarily, the relationship between <choice> 
and <liberty> severely limits the extent to which the right to choose can be exercised by 
all women. For many, the victory obtained in Roe has been central to achieving equality 
for women. However, an ideographic analysis of the development of <choice> reveals 
the extent to which the very ideological assumptions that gave rise to the right to choose 
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function simultaneously as the justification for the denial of the ability to exercise the 
right.  
Many feminists articulate the right to choose as central to the cause of women's 
equality and even a necessary right in struggles to end women's opression. The pro-
choice movement has hailed the right to choose as “an empowering emblem of liberation 
from the tyranny of biology” (Sollinger, 2001, p. 199). The analysis of Choices sends a 
clear message that for pro-choice women <choice> "is essential for women's full 
emancipation and participation in society. Without the freedom to choose, women's 
march toward equality would have stalled long ago" (Choices, 1997, p. 6).  It is not until 
the relationships between <choice> and other ideographs such as <liberty> are revealed 
and explored that the inability of <choice> to live up to its purpose comes into view.  
The revelation that <choice> is not a right that stands on its own foundation 
legally, rather that its emergence as a legal concept is only possible with the higher order 
ideal of <liberty>.  is essential to understanding the potential for<choice> to function as a 
constitutional protection. <Choice> emerged out of the Court as dependent upon 
<liberty>.This dependency is then invoked in the process of chipping away at the ability 
of <choice> to accomplish its original purpose.  With each additional attempt by the 
Supreme Court to expand upon the meaning and basis of <choice>, <liberty> has been 
envoked to justify specific limitations of the right to choose. In Maher, as the Court 
elaborated upon the grounding of <choice> in <liberty> the state became vested with the 
ability to assert a "value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion” (1977). Liberty is 
the vehicle through which particular values are embedded into <choice>. The state 
utilizes <liberty> to justify promotion of childbirth over abortion. This is a stark contrast 
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to the meaning of <choice> asserted by pro-choice advocates. Whereas advocates of 
<choice> purport it to represent the right to obtain a safe abortion, the state employs a 
higher order ideograph (<liberty>) to restrict that right. This analysis of <liberty> is 
employed again in Harris and even more so in Webster. The extent to which liberty does 
not entail a government obligation to provide access to particular rights such as the right 
to obtain an abortion is justified by the example that the state has no obligation to provide 
medical care at all. The Supreme Court even goes as far as to say that because the 
government has no obligation to operate public hospitals in the first place, it therefore 
cannot be obligated to ensure access to any medical procedure, much less an abortion 
(Webster, 1989, p. 509).  
This ideographic criticism of <choice> reveals a severe limitation of <liberty> 
that it does not obligate the government to act; rather it protects citizens from interference 
from the government.  In Webster, the Supreme Court promoted the infusion of particular 
values into government determinations of what activities it will promote and those it will 
not promote. In this particular instance, the government determined that it could promote 
childbirth through its funding of childbirth, but denial of funding for abortions. This is an 
example of how <liberty>, a seemingly benign and objective ideal can be invoked to 
justify the assertion of particular values over others.   
McGee posits that although “we are taught to look for an objective definition of 
‘liberty’” (1980b, p. 24); ideographic analysis reveals the ways in which our notions of 
liberty are not as objective as they initially appear.  For McGee, his ideographic analysis 
led him to believe that American <liberty> was not the same as freedom. He uses an 
example of an individual who upon deciding to move to Yugoslavia during the 1970’s 
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when it was an extension of the Eastern Block.  McGee   this individual felt as though, 
even without free speech, he experienced greater liberty under totalitarianism than in the 
United States. The inability of the American consciousness to consider that one could feel 
more liberated under totalitarianism is a result of the ways in which ideology that is held 
as value neutral exist not only as “’wrong’; they are rather positively dangerous” 
(McGee, 1980b, p. 25).  McGee stresses the importance of contrasting experiences of 
peoples whose experiences with ideologies run contrary to widely held notions of 
objective ideology based on “a system of philosophical abstractions” (24). The 
insidiousness of ideology is exposed through this contrast of experience with abstraction. 
For McGee, ideology is not objective, it is subjective. An example of the subjectiveness 
of ideology is the ability of the Supreme Court to use <liberty> as a justification for 
valuing childbirth over abortion. 
Implications for the Pro-Choice Movement 
In exploring pro-choice rhetoric it is evident that pro-choice advocates seek to 
posit <choice> as an objective abstraction constituting a “fundamental American value, a 
cardinal principle, and a constitutionally protected right" (Schneider, Choices, p. 6).  The 
claim that <choice> is capable of existing in such a value neutral way is undercut largely 
by its inability to prevent particular populations from being excluded  
Indeed this ideographic analysis of <choice> confirms McGee’s notion that 
seemingly benign ideologies can operate in dangerous ways. McGee argues that 
ideologies become abstracted in the American consciousness (much the same way 
<choice> is abstracted in Pro-Choice consciousness) in an attempt to create a “false fairy-
tale” (McGee, 1983,p. 113) in order to excuse particular behaviors, in this case the false 
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fairy-tale of <choice> allows Pro-Choice Americans to accept the exclusion of particular 
populations from accessing the right to choose because their abstracted notion of the ideal 
of <choice> could not conceivably produce the opposite of its intent.  Grounding 
<choice> in <liberty> enables particular populations to be excluded from the promise of 
<choice> that is so widely advanced by its feminist advocates. One of the ways in which 
this exclusion manifests itself is through the denial of public funding for abortion. 
Angela Hooten, the Director of the National Latina Institute for Reproductive 
Health argues that  grounding <choice> in <liberty> and <privacy> contributes to 
inequalities among women "Although the privacy argument was effective in securing 
certain reproductive rights under the Constitution, it has provided the Supreme Court a 
doctrinal justification for denying low-income women equal access to reproductive 
rights” (2005). The Supreme Court repeatedly cites the failure of privacy to require a 
government obligation as its justification for the denial of the use of public funds for 
abortion services.  As a result of the denial of public funding for abortion, women in the 
United States are divided into two classes, those who can choose and those who cannot. It 
just so happens to be that the majority of those who do not enjoy the right to choose are 
the poorest and most stigmatized members of our society. For these women, choice is 
nothing more than an illusion.      
The implication of the use of <liberty> as the justification for the denial of public 
funds for abortion is the division of women into two classes, those who can afford to 
choose and those who cannot afford to choose. This division situates abortion within a 
consumer context. Rickie Sollinger (2001) argues that “choice” rhetoric is part of an 
“individualistic, marketplace” (p. 6) mentality that pervades our “consumer-culture” (p. 
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6). When reproductive rights become reduced to a “choice” that can only be exercised by 
those with the resources to act on that “choice” the effect is “defining some groups of 
women as good choice makers and some as bad” (p. 7). Sollinger argues that this “era of 
choice” is marked by the increasing commodification of reproduction in which some 
women are legitimate consumers of choice and others are perceived as illegitimate 
consumers of choice (p. 7). This becomes translated into notions of what kind of woman 
is an appropriate mother, and who is not. If you are a woman who is capable of making 
an informed <choice> (a woman with the financial resources to make a choice) you fall 
into the category of being a legitimate mother, one who can determine when it is "right" 
for her to become a mother.  Those who are not capable of making a <choice> because of 
a lack of financial resources are illegitimate mothers.  The implication of this is that 
motherhood has become a class privilege in the United States (p. 200). The right to obtain 
an abortion becomes a right that you can exercise only if you can afford it.  
Because rhetorical criticism compels us to seek out those who are excluded from 
ideology, it is necessary to explore who those excluded are and what the implication of 
that exclusion is. The lack of choice among low-income women of color not only places 
theoretical limitations on the capacity of choice to characterize the experiences of 
women, it also contributes to the exacerbation of inequalities in reproductive freedoms 
for all women in the United States. In Maher, the court's articulation of <choice> as a 
<liberty> concern allowed the state the ability to reserve the right to inject value 
judgements into women's choices. While the state will not pay for women to have an 
abortion, the state will pay for women to give birth, additionally the state will pay for 
women to be sterilized. Betty Horsburgh (1996) has argued that the state’s willingness to 
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pay for tubal ligation but not abortion causes low income women who do not wish to 
have any more children to be coerced into accepting sterilization as a form of birth 
control (p. 557). For Sollinger (1991), choice has been formulated within a larger context 
of racism, sexism, and classism (p. 35) allowing the state to assert control of the 
reproductive capacities of women of color. Andrea Smith (2002) explains that this 
assertion of control over the reproductive capacities of certain populations is deeply 
rooted in a constant struggle to “purify itself”. She argues that “control over women’s 
reproductive abilities and destruction of women and children are essential to destroying a 
people” (p. 124). In its attempt to purge itself of undesirable populations the state does 
not bestow the right to bodily integrity upon low-income women of color (p. 124).  
A primary example of the way in which the state attempts to purify itself is the 
instance of Native American women. Recall that the Hyde Amendment prevents native 
women who are dependent upon the Indian Health Services organization to provide 
healthcare from exercising the option of coverage for an abortion, but they do have the 
option to be sterilized. Smith argues that “Native women in particular, whose ability to 
reproduce stands in the way of the continued conquest of Native lands, threatens the 
continued success of colonization” (2002, p. 123). In other words, the denial of funding 
for abortions of Native American women is part of a larger process of colonization. 
Surely, the government does not explicitly pronounce its intent to ensure there are no 
Native Americans left to make claims to their lands, but a legacy of colonialism informs 
the law in ways that perpetuate the extermination of Native peoples. <Choice>, as 
derived from <liberty> provides a justification for the continued process of purifying the 
public. 
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Indeed, for McGee one of the primary functions of ideographs is to mask and 
excuse such attempts by the state.  For him, the implication ideographs present are that 
their existence “warrants the use of power, excuses behavior and belied which might 
otherwise be perceived as eccentric or antisocial, and guides behavior and belief into 
channels easily recognized by a community as acceptable and laudable” (McGee, 1980a 
p. 15). Choice does exactly this by lulling the populous into thinking that women have 
been empowered through control of their own reproduction when in fact choice as a 
liberty interest is precisely the justification for denying particular populations control 
over their bodies.  The American public would not normally stand for the coerced 
sterilization or denial of rights to entire populations, but the “era of choice” provides not 
only a justification but political cover for such actions because they are diametrically 
opposed to the alleged idea content of “choice” that is promoted and widely assumed by 
Pro-Chocie Advocates. This distinction between choice as a vehicle for the empowerment 
of women and choice as a mask and justification for the extermination of populations is 
what McGee called the difference between its “alleged idea content” and “concrete 
history as usages”.  Because the “right to choose” is expressly a negative right, choice is 
the justification for the constitutionality of funding bans.  This is precisely how 
ideographs operate to excuse behaviors that might not otherwise be acceptable.  
 If rhetorical critics are to provide openings for those who are suppressed 
by ideology as Sonja Foss suggests then communication scholars must inject their 
findings into the public consciousness. In the instance of the politics of <choice>, 
communication stidies of this nature may contribute to further theorizing in other fields. 
Here, the inability of the ideograph of choice to compensate for the needs of all women 
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and indeed the violence it inflicts upon populations, including those whose righs are 
foreclosed because of their status as dependents upon the state calls for posing broader 
questions of feminist theorizing. If choice is the culmination of feminist theorizing about 
reproductive rights, it certainly needs to be rethought. Angela Hooten has suggested that 
“the movement needs to digest critiques of the term “choice” that are based on the 
historical experiences of poor women of color” (2005 p. 83) in order to construct a 
feminism that can account for the needs of all women.  Further research might direct 
itself in a manner that contributes directly to feminist scholarship. 
Continued ideographical criticism in this manner can contribute to mapping the 
synchronic relationships among ideologies. If in this instance, <choice> finds itself linked 
with other ideographs such as <liberty>, there may be a great potential for research to 
broaden it’s analysis to uncover infinite relationships among seemingly disparate 
ideographs.  
Methodological Implications 
There are two primary implications this analysis reveals about the method of 
ideographical criticism. First, this analysis reveals how problematic it is to separate 
diachronic structure from synchronic usages of ideographs. Simultaneously, this work 
also underscores the importance of ideographic analysis particularly, in assessing the 
coherence of legal concepts.  
If diachronic structure refers to the development of ideographs over time, and 
synchronic relationships refer to the ways in which ideographs are connected and 
associated with other ideographs in their rhetorical manifestations or usages. In the 
process of this ideographic criticism of <choice> it has been difficult to separate these 
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two notions of ideographic usages, diachronic and synchronic from each other. Because 
<choice> emerges diachronically from the court’s articulation of a right to privacy, its 
diachronic emergence is directly associated with its synchronic relationship to <privacy>. 
Simultaneously, privacy, much like <choice> exists because of a synchronic relationship 
articulated between <privacy> and <liberty>. Were it not for these synchronic 
relationships, the diachronic emergence of the ideograph of <choice> would be virtually 
impossible. Indeed, it seems that because ideographs are as McGee suggests “Each 
ideograph is thus connected to all others as brain cells are linked by synapses, 
synchronically in one context at one specific moment” (McGee, 1980, p. 16).  While 
McGee suggests that we investigate ideographs in isolation, <choice> in particular is a 
difficult ideograph to isolate from others. Its significance rests in the synchronic 
relationship(s) <choice> shares with other ideographs.  
This finding, that diachronic emergence, and synchronic relationships are difficult 
to separate from one another for the purposes of ideographic analysis leads one to 
question exactly how McGee envisioned this analysis proceeding. An ideographic 
criticism of <choice> in legal and pro-choice rhetoric reveals the extent to which the 
relationships between ideographs contribute to the meaning and limitations of ideographs 
themselves. This study reveals the ways in which the connection between <choice> and 
<liberty> provides a basis for the exclusion of particular populations from the ability to 
avail themselves of the right to choose. As such, <choice> is incapable to fulfilling its 
alleged idea content of ensuring all women have the right to choose. The relationship 
between <choice> and <liberty> allows the government to subjectively inject value 
determinations into the law that severely undercut the choices available to women. As 
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such <choice> becomes a hollow ideal, incapable to preserving the very rights it sets out 
to preserve while simultaneously operating as a justification for its own denial.  
Certainly, ideographic criticism such as this is useful in investigating legal 
concepts such as rights. And, indeed, the conclusions brought forth from this particular 
analysis of <choice>, particularly that <choice> is incapable of maintaining the legal 
right to an abortion because of its close relationship with <liberty> would be impossible 
to see without investigating the synchronic relationships among and between ideographs. 
As a result, ideographic analysis is perhaps the only way for one to see the legal 
limitations of legal ideals. In this respect, ideographic criticism has the capacity to play 
an essential role in understanding constitutional debates.  
Conclusion 
This work arose as a personal investigation of feminism, and particularly the 
ability of <choice> as a feminist idea to transcend the multiple identity divides that exist 
within feminist populations. This work began with great hope, that particular issues, like 
<choice> might have the capability of overcoming that, which separates feminists in their 
attempts to overcome the oppression and domination of populations. In its enactment, this 
ideographic criticism reveals that not only is <choice> as a feminist ideal incapable of 
bridging these divides, but it further reveals the inability of <choice> to maintain itself as 
a legal doctrine to protect a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion. It is foreseeable that in 
the future, courts will limit a woman’s right to choose based upon their interpretation of 
<liberty> as a right to be free from governmental interference.  
This work further reveals that not only is <choice> an unsustainable ideal, it 
serves as a false ideal for feminist movements and organizations. Because adherence to 
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<choice> as an ideal obscures the abject lack of choices so many women face, continued 
assertion of <choice> as an ideal that represents all women is doomed to alienate those 
who cannot materially identify with <choice>.  
Finally, this work underscores the importance of ideographic criticism in 
revealing that which is concealed by abstract ideals. Ideographic criticism can play an 
incredibly important role in understanding the ideals that underpin our societal constructs 
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